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ABSTRACT

For decades now, the nature of independent leaners has been a source of debate and
dispute. Are those people who self-identify as independent leaners skeptical, critical
thinkers, or are they actually closet partisans who are simply denying their partisanship.
Questions of religiosity are used as proxies to measure an individual’s inclination towards
affect in general. The question asked is whether independent leaners show lower levels of
religiosity than both strong and weak partisans.
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Introduction
For decades now, the nature of independent leaners has been a source of debate and
dispute. Are those people who self-identify as independent leaners skeptical, critical
thinkers, or are they actually closet partisans who are simply denying their partisanship?
Questions of religiosity are used as proxies to measure an individual’s inclination towards
affect in general. The question asked is whether independent leaners show lower levels of
religiosity than both strong and weak partisans.
In the American National Election Surveys (ANES), partisanship and independence are
measured on a seven-point scale in response to a series of questions. The first question asked
of the respondents is whether they think of themselves as a Republican, a Democrat, an
independent, or what? The responses to this first question provide us with a three-point scale
categorizing more than two-thirds of the sample into the categories of Republican, Democrat,
and independent. Republicans and Democrats are then asked about the strength of their
partisanship by asking if they consider themselves to be strong or weak Republicans or
Democrats. At this point we then have a five-point scale of political party affiliation. Those
respondents who initially self-identify as independents are asked an additional question to
tease out political preferences by asking whether they think of themselves as being closer to
the Republican or Democratic parties. This adds two new categories to round out the sevenpoint scale which is typically organized as: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, (independent)
leans Democrat, (pure) independent, (independent) leans Republican, weak Republican, and
strong Republican. It is those individuals that initially classify themselves as independents,

but under further prompting admit to a preference for one of the parties that are the subject of
this inquiry.
Who are the so-called “partisan independents” (Keith et al, 1992)? The question itself
presents a problem in that the two terms contradict each other; either one is partisan or one is
independent. Flanigan and Zingale define partisanship as “the sense of attachment or
belonging that an individual feels for a political party” (1998, 51). If a partisan hears one of
their party leaders advocating for a specific policy, they will have “a basis in party loyalty for
supporting that policy, quite apart from other considerations” (54). Political candidates
sanctioned by the party may also find an inherent favorable inclination from their party’s
partisans. A political independent, by definition, is an individual who would not have this
same form of political party attachment.
A textbook from the end of the 19th century within the polarized environment of the spoils
system, categorized independents this way:
As on the playground, some do not always care to go with the crowd, or even
prefer to be by themselves. Such as these, who think for themselves, and dare to
stand alone, make the Independents in politics.
They are likely to prefer the good of their country to the success of their party.
They will not act with their party, or will leave it, if it is wrong. If the other party
changes, as parties sometimes change, and advocates measures that they believe
in; if they change their own minds as sensible men sometimes must; or if the
other party puts forward better candidates; or if a new party arises, the
independent voters are willing to act wherever they can best secure the public
welfare. (Dole, 1891, 127)
This definition of an independent accepts that the independent will affiliate with one or the
other party, but that that affiliation ends when the party’s concept of the public good is in
conflict with the independent’s concept of the public good. The key to this particular
2

definition is that it defines an independent not as lacking in party affiliation, but that the
nature of that affiliation differs substantially from that of a partisan.

Evolution of the Debate
This textbook view of an independent remained dominant until the publishing of The
American Voter by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960). These authors analyzed
data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan with the view that, as a
bloc, independents “have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the
candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their concern over the outcome is
relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, although it is indeed made
later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discoverable evaluations of the
elements of national politics” (Campbell, et al, 1960, 143). These findings were in the
context of record consensus between the political parties (Downs, 1957; McCarty, et al,
2006) in which party policies differed only at the margins, liberals, moderates, and
conservatives could be found in either party, and faith in government was high (Skocpol,
1996, 109). Under these conditions, with both parties acting in a manner that is providing
positive results for society, with an absence of extreme positions, it would follow that the
textbook independent would have no qualms about declaring a preference for a specific
party. It is also in this context that only the politically unaware would be unable to identify a
preference for a particular party.
During the 1960s, there was an increase in the percentage of the population that identified
themselves as being independent (Bowler et al, 2009; Campbell, et al, 1980; Keith, et al,
3

1992). During the 1960s, there were many potential causes of a possible realignment
including the nomination of Barry Goldwater by Republicans, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which gave way to a realignment of the South from a
Democratic stronghold to a Republican stronghold, and the Viet Nam War which found
students, fearing the draft, responding favorably to Nixon’s message to end the war. Some
have argued that in the realignment process, the position of independent leaner was taken as a
temporary placeholder by some as they shifted party allegiance from one party to another
(Flanigan and Zingale, 1998). For example, from 1952 to 1968 the percentage of white
voters declaring themselves to be independent increased from 12% to 37% with the spike at
37% coinciding with former Democrat and segregationist George Wallace running as an
independent candidate in 1968 (Keith et al, 1992, 34).
Studies conducted with data from this period began to distinguish between “pure”
independents and independent leaners. Data compiled that separated out these two groups
individually consistently came back with the same results: “Partisan Independents always
have been relatively interested, informed, and active, and Pure Independents have been
notably uninterested, ignorant and inactive” (Keith et al, 1992, 41). Demographic data
regarding these two groups found “Pure Independents are at the bottom and partisan
Independents at or near the top on measures of political involvement” (Keith et al, 1992, 41)
and political sophistication. In terms of political party involvement and activity including
participating in primaries, financial contributions, meeting attendance, being delegates at
conventions, and concern with who wins the election, the independent leaners are similar to
weak partisans. In terms of political sophistication and knowledge, the independent leaners
4

are more like strong partisans. Above all, the independent leaners, in the aggregate, bear
very little resemblance to pure independents. Independent leaners are above average in
education and income while pure independents are below average in these regards. This
assertion is echoed in data presented by Phillip Converse in 1964, Walter Dean Burnham in
1970, Robert Cantor in 1975, Theodore J Macaluso in 1977, Warren E. Miller and Teresa E
Levitin in 1976, and John C. Pierce and Paul R Hagner in 1988 (Keith et al, 1992).
There is no debate remaining in the literature regarding the apolitical nature of pure
independents, and that as a group they diverge in almost all respects from independent
leaners, with the exception of initially identifying themselves as independents. It is for this
reason that I focus on an issue that continues to be debated, whether there is any real
difference between partisans and independent leaners. In response to the claim that
independents “share some characteristics that differentiate them in important ways from
Republicans and Democrats” The Myth of the Independent Voter declares “This assumption
is wrong. Independents, defined inclusively have little in common. They are more diverse
than either Republicans or Democrats. Most of them are not uncommitted, and they are not a
bloc. They are largely closet Democrats and Republicans” (Keith et al, 1992, 4).
In The Myth of the Independent Voter, Keith et al (1992) do an admirable job of tracing
the debate of the independence or partisanship of independent leaners; providing survey data
and information gleaned from other studies to determine if there truly is a difference between
leaners and partisans that can be teased from the data. Numerous hypotheses are tested and
discarded, including political behavior, attitudes, and demographics. As has already been
discussed, a good deal of their data on political behavior shows independent leaners as
5

behaving very similarly to weak partisans in terms of party activity and political knowledge.
In addition, the behavior of the leaners is very similar to that of weak partisans in terms of
voter turnout, party loyalty at the ballot box, and the frequency of split-ticket voting. One
dataset where leaners and weak partisans differed consistently and by large amounts is in
self-reporting of whether the respondent has “always voted for the same party’s presidential
candidate” (Keith et al, 1992, 104). The authors pointed to panel studies performed by
Richard A. Brody that showed respondents who switched parties as claiming that they had
always voted for the same party. Those who showed consistency in their party loyalty during
the panel study often indicated that they had not always voted for that party. Brody’s panel
study casts doubt on the validity of this question, and Keith et al, (1992) suggest that it may
well be that those who identify themselves as party loyalists may value party loyalty while
those who identify themselves as independents value political independence and that
responses to this question may more clearly reflect affect for the term than necessarily past
behavior.
Keith et al (1992) also look at the relationship of age to partisanship. This relationship
developed relatively recently. “Not until 1964 were people under the age of 29 significantly
more likely than the entire population to be Pure Independent. In 1968 a monotonic
relationship between youth and pure independence emerged” (Keith et al, 1992, 116), a
similar pattern is seen for independent Democrats starting in 1956. The strongest growth in
independents from 1965 to 1967 came in the age groups from 21-29 and 30-49, the highest
income brackets, college educated, minorities, and white-collar occupations (Burnham,
1970). This increase in independents coincides with substantial increases of educational
6

attainment for the 25-29 age groups from 1950 to the late 1970s as funding for education
increased and college deferments from the draft swelled the enrollment rates of colleges and
universities. In 1950, this age group had less than 10% with Bachelor’s degrees and just over
50% with a high school education. By 1980, this age group had over 20% with Bachelor’s
degrees and nearly 90% had a high school diploma (US Census Bureau, 2003). This was
commented on by Gerald Pomper (1975) “The growth of Independents has come particularly
in those persons with sufficient education to permit freedom from party cues” (Keith et al,
1992, 129).
Keith et al (1992) do find strong correlations between age and partisanship, and attribute
much of the growth in the 1970s of self-identified independents as being associated with the
baby boomer generation reaching voting age and the introduction of the 26th Amendment.
Attitudes toward political parties, interest groups, and political issues were also tested.
With the use of feeling thermometers, in which respondents are asked to rate how they feel
about a particular party, group or policy a score is provided on a scale of 0 to 100. Designed
to measure “warmth of affect” (Keith et al, 1992), a score above 50 would denote a positive
affect for the question object, where a score below 50 would denote a negative affect. A
score of 50 then might denote ambivalence. Averages of these scores were taken by selfidentification on the 7-point scale and compared. When feeling thermometers looked at
“marijuana users, women’s liberationists, black militants, radical students, civil rights
leaders, and urban rioters” (Keith et al, 1992, 154), all categories of partisan identification
showed negative responses to these groups when combined into one group. While the
Republican side of the equation follows the predictable monotonic order, the Democratic side
7

does not. Independent Democratic leaners show greater tolerance for these groups while
strong Democrats appear similar to independent Republicans and weak Democrats appear
similar to weak Republicans. A similar test was run with attitudes toward “the police, the
military, and big business” (155). All partisan classifications were positive to these three
groups when lumped together. The monotonic relationship displayed here, however, differed
slightly from the previous group. In this set of data from the 1972 Michigan survey,
independent leaners were the least favorable to these groups, weak partisans slightly more
favorable with strong partisans being most favorable. Four of these seven classifications of
partisanship provided scores of 67 or 68, so this does not provide for a significant finding,
but it does suggest a question that bears closer scrutiny. Do those who claim stronger
partisan affiliation have greater respect for authority than those with weaker affiliations? The
responses were also broken down by age group, with younger age groups having a less
negative view of anti-authority groups and older age groups having a more positive view of
authority figures.
In terms of political behavior, political knowledge, political attitudes, and attitudes toward
parties and issues Keith et al (1992) and later, John Petrocik (2009) found no substantive
difference between independent leaners and weak partisans other than the inclination to
identify themselves differently when responding to whether they are a Democrat, a
Republican, or an independent. In Petrocik’s (2009) analysis, he concludes that independents
are closet partisans whose self-representation is a mischaracterization “about how they
approach elections and make judgments about candidates.” (572)

8

Returning to the textbook definition of an independent provided earlier in this paper, there
is no real indication that the independent will differ from the partisan in any of the observable
behaviors tested for by Keith et al (1992) or Petrocik (2009) with the possible exception of
party defection and split-ticket voting. Still, more recent data collected in the context of third
party candidates have shown greater variance in these political behaviors between partisans
and independent leaners (Bowler, et al, 2009) than shown by Keith et al (1992) and Petrocik
(2009). However, it is the thought processes through which the observable behavior is
derived that separates the independents from the partisans.

Partisanship and Religiosity
By returning briefly to the time period from the textbook description of independents, the
late 19th century, Walter Dean Burnham (1982) identified correlations between religious
preferences and partisan direction in survey data from Hendricks County, Indiana. Pietistic
(Protestant) observers predominantly identified with the Republican Party (23.8% D, 72.3%
R). Liturgical (Catholic and Jewish) observers predominantly identified with the Democratic
Party (79.7% D, 14.4% R). Those who professed no religious denomination were evenly
split in party preference (48.4% D, 47.1% R). Burnham believed that a dearth of
entertainment and social interaction left a void filled with both religious and political rally
attendance. Those with whom you attended church were also those who attended the
political rally of your choice. Both were social events. This relationship has largely been
taken for granted over the years and has been commented on in much of the literature
(Campbell et al., 1980; Flanigan and Zingale, 1998).
9

Kenneth Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown (2010) provide similar studies regarding
denominational choice and partisan direction. Their classifications of partisanship are split
into only three categories; Democrats, Republicans, and independents, with independent
leaners being grouped with their preferred parties. Wald and Calhoun-Brown, using more
recent data than previous studies showing Catholics as strong Democrats, identify Catholics
as now being situated in the political middle of the electorate.
In a study very similar in intent to what I am considering here, Stephen Mockabee (2007)
utilized a broader “authority-mindedness” measure to determine partisan strength and
direction which found that strong Republicans had higher levels of respect for authority and
strong Democrats had lower levels of respect for authority. For his measure of “authoritymindedness” he incorporated the variables for biblical interpretation, religious affiliation, and
religious commitment.
Campbell et al. (1980) discuss social cross-pressures that would create “conflict within the
individual’s psychological field to membership in social groupings of dissimilar political
preferences.” This contradictory effect was further examined by Maruice Mangum (2008) in
his discussion of how black Protestants, an ideologically Conservative group in religious
matters, tend to remain faithful to the Democratic Party while white Catholics appear to be
deserting the party.
Mangum (2008) concluded that the variables of religious guidance and church attendance
worked in opposing directions with black Protestants. The religious guidance variable
correlated positively with Democratic Party identification while church attendance correlated
negatively with Democratic Party identification. Mangum was looking at how these
10

variables affected partisan direction in a black population, I am more concerned with how
these variables might affect bidirectional partisan strength in the broader society.
If we return to the original concept of what it means to be a partisan and what it means to
be independent, we realize that it may not always be the political attitudes and voting
behaviors of the individual that determine their level of partisanship, but the evaluative
processes behind how those attitudes and behaviors are derived. Discussions of the
evaluative process necessarily involve both cognitive and affective perceptions. Those
declaring greater party loyalty may well respond more readily to their affective perceptions
within the evaluative process.
The question of whether the evaluative processes of political independents differ from
that of partisans is not necessarily discernible from observable behavior because it is an
internal process. The challenge that this provides the researcher is whether there is data
available that may more clearly provide insight to these thought processes.

The Psychological Bases of Partisan Strength
In 2000, Steven Greene published “The Psychological Sources of Partisan-Leaning
Independence”. Greene utilized a survey that was admittedly suboptimal in its methodology
of sample selection, and did not mirror the U.S. population. Surveys were sent out to 1,250
registered voters in a single metropolitan Midwestern county with the incentive of a $150
drawing for one of the respondents. The sample was developed from the 302 surveys that
were returned. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents were white and the sample was more
conservative than is usually found in nationally representative surveys (43% Republican,
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29% Democrat, 48% conservative, 26% liberal). In this survey, he used an
affective/cognitive measurement strategy previously employed by social psychologists.
The affective/cognitive measurement strategy adopted by Greene (2000) used the
“Democratic party” and the “Republican party” as attitude objects (519). Three sets of terms
were used to measure affect, cognition, and evaluation for each party. Each of the
measurement sets contained both positive and negative terms. Respondents were asked to
rate the political parties on a seven-point scale according to whether they felt the word was
representative of the party in question, with 1 indicating “not at all” and 7 indicating
“definitely”. With the affective set, respondents were asked how the parties made them feel.
The eight words used in the affective measure were “delighted, happy, joy, relaxed, hateful,
disgusted, annoyed, and angry”. (519) The cognitive word set included “useful, valuable,
beneficial, wise, unsafe, unhealthy, worthless, and harmful.” (520) The evaluative word set
used “good, positive, like, desirable, bad, dislike, undesirable, and negative” as
measurements. The average of the negative responses within each measurement set was
subtracted from the average of the positive responses to derive measures of affect, cognition,
and evaluation ranging from a positive attitude (6) toward the party in question to a negative
attitude (-6). These data were then analyzed in relation to the respondents’ preferred parties
to derive the strength of affect and cognition in the evaluative process.
Steven Greene (2000) identified strong partisans as being distinguished by having more
positive attitudes (in affect, cognition, and evaluation measures) “across the board” (522)
toward their preferred party. Affective and cognitive measures for weak partisans and
leaners showed little to no statistical difference from each other, however, there was variation
12

between these two groups in the weight of affect vs. cognition in overall evaluation.
“Leaners represent a group where cognition is a dominant component of partisanship, with
affect playing no role, in contrast to true partisans (both weak and strong) where cognition is
the primary component of partisan evaluation, but significantly supplemented by partisan
affect” (Greene 2000, 522).
In addition to his discussion of cognitive and affective differences between independent
leaners and partisans, Greene also discussed the role of political socialization and the
inclination of children to adopt the political parties of their parents long before policy
positions, candidates, and issues hold any meaning (Greene, 2000). Independent leaners are
more likely than partisans to have at least one independent parent.
Greene (2000) was able to correctly classify 86% of his respondents between partisans
and leaners. Leaners showed an absence of affect in the evaluative process, more
independent social identity, different patterns of parental socialization, and greater
dissatisfaction with the parties than partisans. It is the emphasis on cognition in the
evaluative process that is the focus of this paper.
In Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment, Marcus et al (2000) described people as
operating with preexisting assumptions and opinions. All new sensory information is seen as
moving through the amygdala, deriving an emotional response, prior to moving to the cortex
region for further processing. The authors identify two different methods through which
individuals make political decisions, one is through “casual, even thoughtless, reliance on
habitual dispositions,” the other is through “reasoned consideration.” (95) When the
individual faces common, recurring conditions, habitual dispositions will prevail. When a
13

novel or unusual condition presents itself, then the individual will move to reasoned
consideration and search for more information on the topic. (Marcus et al, 2000)
Their research determined that partisans who were anxious about their own candidates were
more likely to indulge in information searches. In the context of this theory, I would argue
that while partisans and independents may well perform information searches, that the
neutrality of these searches may well vary between the two groups. Studies have shown that
ideologically motivated individuals tend to self-select information sources and limit their
searches to those sources that will confirm and fortify their existing worldview. (Taber and
Lodge, 2010) Data that contradict this worldview are denied or deflected by the partisan,
where they are given greater consideration by the less ideological. (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010)
The news media at large is distrusted while the self-selected source becomes a trusted source
of information. (Gronke and Cook, 2007) For example, partisans and independent leaners
alike may be motivated by anxiety produced by the mortgage meltdown and the financial
crisis to conduct an information search. The independent leaner will look for unbiased,
nonpartisan information to get a better understanding of the situation. The partisan, on the
other hand, will search for an explanation that conforms to their worldview, typically looking
for information placing the blame for the mess on the shoulders of the opposing party. Even
though the information search is a cognitive process, when the form of the search is affective
in nature, the activity cannot be classified as purely cognitive.
Two groups of scholars looked to potential genetic differences in studies involving twin
pairs to determine whether partisanship is primarily a socialized phenomena or whether there
might be a genetic element involved. A potential genetic link to partisan strength may
14

indicate that independents and partisans process information differently as a matter of
physiological differences. If this is largely influenced by genotypic variation, we might
consider the possibility that information processing differences would extend to both political
and religious considerations.
As part of a symposium in Political Research Quarterly, in 2009, Hatemi et al and Settle
et al published findings from twin studies1 examining possible genetic variation related to
political partisanship. The Hatemi group was geneticists aided by political scientists while
the Settle group was political scientists aided by geneticists. This is mentioned here as the
methodologies employed vary slightly. The results published in both studies found that
genetic factors could account for nearly 50% of partisan strength but not partisan direction
Hatemi, et al, 2009, 596; Settle et al, 2009, 605).
Greene (2000) identified a measure that demonstrated a difference between levels of
affect in the evaluative process and partisan strength. The research performed by Hatemi et
al, (2009) and Settle et al, (2009) suggest that partisan strength, or the inclination to identify
(or not identify) strongly with a political party may also be a heritable trait. Both of the twin
studies groups discussed religiosity as being analogous to partisan strength with partisan
direction being analogous to denominational choice (Hatemi et al. 2009; Settle et al. 2009);
the first being a heritable trait, while the second is not. The results of both studies can be
1

Twin studies have often been utilized to consider the question of nature versus nurture. By studying
monozygotic twins and dizygotic twins who would presumably share similar childhood experiences and levels
of socialization/indoctrination, geneticists are able to assess the level of influence of environment and genetics
for particular behaviors. The monozygotic twins are developed from a single fertilized egg (zygote) which splits
into two different embryos, making the twins genetically identical. Dizygotic twins, on the other hand are
developed from two separate eggs fertilized from different sperm, resulting in an average of 50% of genetic
similarities, similar to those shared of other siblings. This assumption, which is the rationale for twin studies,
has been reconsidered by recent studies of embryogenesis that disputes these claims of embryo development.
(Boklage, 2009; Hague, etal, 2009; Skipper, 2008)
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described in this manner; “the intensity of one’s attachment to a group may be shaped by
genetic predispositions, but the selection of the group to which one attaches is largely shaped
by parental and environmental exposures” (Settle et al, 2009, 603).
While Keith et al (1992) and Petrocik found that there were no inherent differences in
observable political behavior between weak partisans and independent leaners, the studies by
Greene (2000), Hatemi et al (2009) and Settle et al (2009) show that it is possible to
recognize more discreet psychological differences between the two groups. Whether this is
more closely linked to genetic factors or environmental factors is a question better left to the
social psychologists, but a difference can be discerned nonetheless.
In 2004, Gallup analysts noted lower levels of religiosity by self-identified independents
in comparison to self-identified Democrats and Republicans (Lyons, 2004).
Unfortunately, their data was based on a three-point scale of Republican, Democrat, and
Independent so there is little that we can look at in terms of partisan intensity. While the
differences are minor between partisans and independents on the question of stating a
religious preference, a greater gap can be found in the data when the question is asked
whether the respondent has a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in organized religion;
63% of Republicans expressed this faith as did 52% of Democrats. Only 39% of
independents expressed confidence in organized religion. Gallup suggests the following
explanation: “It’s possible that both the reluctance to adhere to specific religious ideas and
behaviors and the reluctance to align oneself with an established political party both tend to
spring from an unwillingness to commit oneself to a set of prescribed beliefs.” This could
suggest that those with low levels of affect in the religious realm may also show low levels of
16

affect in the political realm. It is not the strength of a belief in a higher power that is of
interest, but a faith in a more specific religious institution that would show high levels of
affect.
When looking for a preexisting measurement in the ANES that may show distinct
differences between partisans and independent leaners in levels of affect, the research above
points to measures of religiosity as a possible clue to differences in partisan strength, or more
precisely, differences between independent leaners, weak partisans, and strong partisans.
Mockabee (2007) used religious measures in his overall measure of authority-mindedness,
Mangum (2008) used religious measures to examine the effects of religiosity on the black
population, Hatemi et al (2009) and Settle et al (2009) use religiosity as being analogous to
partisan strength, and Gallup (Lyons, 2004) goes so far as to suggest a link between
religiosity and the inclination to accept a prescribed set of political beliefs. It would seem
then, that measures of religiosity, or religious affect may well serve as a proxy measure of
partisanship, or political affect.
Although the measures utilized are typically considered to be measures of religiosity
(Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Mangum, 2008; Mockabee, 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown,
2010), in this case they will be utilized to represent the level of affect in the evaluative
process. While Mockabee (2007) critiqued this form of using religious measures as a proxy
for political worldviews, he did so in the context of his measurement of authority which was
the key to his directional argument. His concern was the assumption of some that secularists
tend to have a more liberal outlook on social issues (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010, 33). I
do not make that assumption, nor am I interested in partisan direction, only partisan strength.
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I believe that greater levels of religious affect shall be correlated with greater levels of
political affect.
A faith in a God or Gods, or some level of spirituality does not necessarily suggest a
strong degree of affect. It is when an individual is willing to accept the claims of another or
the group as to the nature and will of God that affect would be strong. This paper will seek
to show that those who demonstrate high levels of religiosity will have an inclination toward
high levels of affect toward political parties. Those with lower levels of religiosity, on the
other hand, will be more inclined toward political independence. Weak partisans would be
expected between the two extremes.
In a study published by John Petrocik (2009), independent leaners bear a close
relationship to weak partisans on multiple issues. The table below is a reproduction of Table
5 from his article. This classifies the aggregated responses working on a scale from 0 – the
most liberal response possible, to 1 – the most conservative response possible. One item
stands out in the table about which Petrocik did not comment. Specifically, that the most

Table 1. The Policy Preferences of Partisans
Dems
Ind
Reps
Issue
Strong Weak
Lean
Pure
Lean
Weak
Strong
Religion
.62
.59
.49
.60
.57
.59
.69
Race
.46
.54
.56
.62
.67
.70
.73
Abortion
.41
.51
.45
.55
.59
.62
.72
Gays
.31
.37
.26
.41
.43
.48
.58
Social
.27
.33
.30
.35
.43
.44
.52
welfare
Force
.54
.56
.54
.62
.68
.67
.78
Size of gov’t .21
.27
.37
.39
.51
.46
.60
Ideology
.35
.46
.40
.53
.62
.64
.76
Note: Reproduced from Petrocik (2009) The range of responses is from 0 (extremely liberal)
to 1 (extremely conservative).
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religious individuals would classify themselves as strong partisans, that weak partisans were
less favorable to religion, and independent leaners were the least religious. This correlation
was bidirectional.
It is my belief that he ignored an important anomaly in his data that on further inspection
may reveal a significant and relevant difference in thought processes between self-identified
partisans and independents.

Expectations
This research will not be looking into the “pure independents”. The literature across
decades concludes that these are typically apathetic, apolitical voters with little interest in
politics. (Campbell et al., 1960; Keith et al., 1992) There is no compelling reason to dispute
this argument. These individuals would be the most likely to be persuaded by campaign
communications as they have little political information beyond the campaign on which to
make a choice. They truly are “up for grabs” and will likely support whichever candidate
happens to make a good case at the time when the voter is paying attention.
Pure independents have lower levels of education and higher levels of religiosity than the
independent leaners. They are a small percentage of the population that, although they skew
the data, they do not do so to a degree that correlations lose significance. With the pure
independents removed from the data, correlations between religiosity and partisan strength
are strengthened. They have been left in the calculations to avoid suggestions that they were
removed as being inconvenient to the findings.
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This paper will look at those respondents who initially self-identify as independents, but
on further prompting relate a preference for one of the two parties. With the winner-take-all,
single-district, American electoral system, a two party system is common. In this
environment, voters consider the policy positions of two rival candidates and make their
selections accordingly. By definition, the difference between the partisans and the leaners, is
that the partisans may base their decision more on affect for the party and, ultimately, the
party’s candidate. Independent leaners, on the other hand, will be less likely to consider the
party of the candidate before coming to a decision. A strong Democrat and an independent
who leans toward the Democratic Party may exhibit the same behavior in the casting of a
ballot, but the process through which they reach that decision may differ.
The problem this presents is that observable behavior is not the key to the question, but
the thought processes that bring about that behavior. Whether the respondent is regarded as
partisan or independent depends on questions of self-identification. Whether through
socialization processes or genetic predisposition, if an individual gives greater weight to
affect in the evaluative process, is inclined to vote the party line, and more readily uses party
identification as a strong basis for the decision-making process, I expect these differing
evaluative processes to extend to other areas of their lives.
Measures of religiosity will be used for measures of affect. The ANES measures of
religiosity are imperfect as a measure of affect which will be discussed later, but at this time
they may be the most appropriate indicator available.
I will examine ANES data from the 2000 (1807 respondents) and 2004 (1212
respondents) Time Series Studies. These years are recent and should still have some
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relevance. Presidential years are used as the general population tends to be more engaged.
The year 2008 is not included as it is the first election year with a minority candidate that
may skew the data. Two years are used to determine if the findings are consistent or a oneoff variation.
Table 2. Religious Preferences of Partisans
7-point scale
Average
7-point scale
Average
Strong Dem
.62
Lean Dem
.49
Weak Dem
.59
Lean Rep
.57
Lean Dem
.49
Weak Dem
.59
Pure Ind
.60
Weak Rep
.59
Lean Rep
.57
Pure Ind
.60
Weak Rep
.59
Strong Dem
.62
Strong Rep
.69
Strong Rep
.69
Note: Reproduced from Petrocik (2009) The range of responses is from 0 (extremely liberal)
to 1 (extremely conservative).
In table 2 I have reintroduced Petrocik’s religious scores that were previously introduced
in table 1. The left column shows the scores by order of the 7-point scale in which the scores
are not monotonic. The right column provides the scores in an ascending, monotonic order.
My expectation is that this pattern of lower levels of religiosity in independent leaners, to
slightly higher levels in weak partisans, to even higher levels in strong partisans will be
echoed in the ANES data in questions that can be used as a measure of religiosity. If the
independent leaners of the seven-point scale really have lower levels of affect in their
political decision-making, we should also see lower levels of religiosity within this group.

Methods
I use four measures of religiosity. One variable involves a single question regarding the
nature of the Bible. Two other variables measure denominational affiliation/attendance and
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religious importance/guidance, with questions whose answers are combined in a manner
similar to how the seven-point partisan scale was developed, with certain responses to the
first question leading to the asking of a follow up question. These specific questions
regarding biblical interpretation, church affiliation, and the importance of religious guidance
have been used in the past as measures of religiosity. (Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Mangum,
2008; Mockabee, 2007; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010) The fourth will be a combined
score of religious affect that is derived from the other three questions. Responses to these
questions will be compared to a “folded over” version of the ANES survey’s seven-point
scale like the one used by Settle et al. (2009)(Gronke, 1997), with 0 coded for pure
independents, 1 for independent leaners, 2 for weak partisans, and 3 for strong partisans. I
will test for the strength of correlation and the significance of the relationship between
religious affect and partisan intensity.
I start with the question on the view of the Bible. In the ANES survey, respondents are
asked “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?”
The possible responses are: 1) “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken
literally, word for word” 2) “The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should
be taken literally, word for word”, and 3) “The Bible is a book written by men and is not the
word of God.” The options of other, don’t know, and refuse to answer have been dropped.
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of
partisanship and their belief in the authority of the Bible.
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Research hypothesis: Strong partisans of both parties will have the greatest inclination to
accept a literal translation of the Bible while independent leaners of both parties will be the
most likely to see the Bible as the word of man.
For the second test of adherence to religious doctrine I use two questions. The first is a
“yes” or “no” question of whether the respondent attends religious services other than
weddings and funerals. The second question is a follow up to the “no” answer and asks
whether the respondent considers themselves to be a part of a particular church or
denomination. This too is also a simple “yes” or “no” question. Respondents will then be
broken down into three categories: 1) those who do not attend church and do not consider
themselves to be a part of a church or religion, 2) those who do not attend church but do
consider themselves to be a part of a church or religion, 3) and those who do attend church.
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of
partisanship and their identification with a particular church or religion.
Research hypothesis: Strong partisans of both parties will have higher levels of
identification with a particular church or religion while independent leaners from both
parties will show lower levels of identification with a particular church or religion.
The third measure of adherence to religious doctrine will also come from two questions.
The first is a “yes” or “no” question asking whether religion is important in the respondent’s
life. The second question is a follow up if the respondent answers “yes” to the first question.
This question asks how much does religion provide guidance in your daily life. The possible
responses are 1) Some, 2) quite a bit, and 3) a great deal. This provides a four-point scale
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with the response of “no” on the first question indicating that religion is not important to the
respondent.
Null hypothesis: There will be no correlation between a respondent’s professed level of
partisanship and their reliance on religion for guidance in their daily lives.
Research hypothesis: Strong partisans of both parties will have greater reliance on religion
for guidance in their daily lives while independent leaners from both parties will show lower
levels of reliance on religion for guidance in their daily lives.
These measures have both advantages and disadvantages as a measure of affect. For
example, how willing an individual may be to take a literal, word-for-word translation of the
Bible could well effectively expose those with high levels of affect. On the other hand, there
are very few individuals (13.7% in 2000, 15.4% in 2004) who see the Bible as the word of
man. With a plurality of respondents seeing the Bible as the word of God that should not be
taken literally (48.2% in 2000, 46% in 2004), we would anticipate that many of the
independent leaners would come from this larger group. However, we should expect that of
those who see the Bible as the word of man a plurality will identify themselves as
independent leaners, while those who believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible will
provide a plurality of strong partisans.
There is only one question that asks if the individual identifies with a particular church or
denomination and that question is asked only as a follow up question to those who do not
attend church. The church attendance question was used to get to those individuals who do
not identify with a particular church or religion. In this case, the act of attending church puts
the individual at the highest level of religiosity in the measure with 70% of the sample
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attending church in 2000 and 67% in 2004. Ideally, there would be a question for those who
attend church to determine whether they adhere to the doctrines of the religion of the church
that they attend, or whether they just attend that church for a reason other than that church’s
specific teachings. If someone is attending a Methodist church when a Lutheran or Baptist
church would suit them just as well, then their level of affect would be lower than someone
who is more insistent on the specific denomination.
The variable for religious importance could be less an indication of affect and more an
indication of spirituality, tolerance, or even compassion, however, it does offer a gradation
that the other measures lack. So even though it does not necessarily get into the question of
whether the respondent affiliates with a group or religious institution, it does have the
advantages of identifying those who do not see religion as important and offers a delineation
on four dimensions rather than three.
The fourth measure of adherence to religious doctrine will combine the three scores
Table 3. Coding for Variable of Overall Religious Score
Question and ANES
Response
Response
codes
value
1. Bible interpretations
’00 – S5
’04 – W4

1. Word of Man, not God .33 x 0
2. Word of God, not literal .33 x .50
3. Word of God, literal
.33 x 1

2. Church affiliation
‘00 – X1 & X1a
‘04 – X1 & X3

1. Does not attend
church/does not affiliate
2. Does not attend
church/affiliates
3. Attends church

.33 x 0

1. Religion not important
2. Some guidance
3. Quite a bit
4. A great deal

3. Religious guidance
’00 – S1 & S2
’04 – W2
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Score

% ‘00

% ’04

0 14.4% 15.7%
.17 50.7% 47.3%
.33 35.0% 36.9%
0 13.8% 14.6%

.33 x .50

.17 16.5% 18.5%

.33 x 1

.33 69.7% 66.9%

.33 x 0
.33 x .33
.33 x .66
.33 x 1

0
.11
.22
.33

23.5%
16.2%
22.1%
38.2%

22.6%
18.0%
23.5%
35.8%

above. In this combined score, all three questions will account for one-third of the overall
score of affect. While the original variables are nominal, their combination should provide a
reliable scale.
A score of zero would indicate a low level of religious affect. As scores increase, affect
increases with a score of .99 indicating a high level of religious affect. Scores of 0 through
.99 are used for ease of computation.
Null hypothesis: There will be no discernible difference between a respondent’s professed
level of partisanship and their score of religious affect.
Research hypothesis: Strong partisans will demonstrate higher scores of religious affect
while independent leaners will demonstrate lower scores of religious affect.
One final question regards age. Studies have shown younger respondents as more likely
to identify themselves as independents, with older respondents having an increasing
inclination to identify as partisan (Flanigan and Zingale, 1998; Keith et al, 1992). In the
studies by Settle et al. (2009) and Hatemi et al. (2009), they had indicated that approximately
45% of the observed variance in partisan strength could be accounted for by genetic factors.
This leaves about 55% of the variance unaccounted for in their studies. It is conceivable that
an individual who carefully and consistently considers the candidates and issues, and votes
accordingly, may find by the time they have reached their forties or fifties that they have
actually supported the same party’s candidates for decades, if not all of their policies. At
some point, the individual who had previously self-identified as independent may start to
report themselves as either a Democrat or a Republican. Looking at the religious scores as
above for age groups may get us closer to understanding this relationship. I believe the data
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will show that the elderly are more religious than younger people, and that this could account
for much of the correlation between age and partisanship.
Null hypothesis: There will be no significant difference in age groups when comparing
professed levels of partisanship and measures of religious affect.
Research hypothesis: Older age groups will demonstrate both higher professed levels of
partisanship, as well as, higher levels of religious affect.

Findings
It is useful to get a baseline from which to operate. Variation in data should be looked at
in relationship to a norm. I have provided data for different demographic groups to establish
what we might expect to see how commonly discussed demographic groups look when put
Table 4. 2000 and 2004 Frequencies (in %) of Demographic Groups
2000 demographic group
all
education 14 +
education less than 14
whites
minorities
Protestant attends
Catholic attends

pure
11.6
8.4
15.1
11.8
11.3
8.7
9.3

lean
28.1
28.5
27.7
28.8
24.4
24
28.2

weak
27.5
28.5
26.5
28.4
25.2
29.4
26.6

strong
32.8
34.6
30.8
31.1
39.1
37.9
35.9

cases
1776
919
857
1370
353
538
354

2004 demographic group
all
education 14 +
education less than 14
whites
minorities
Protestant attends
Catholic attends

pure
9.9
12.7
5.6
8.7
12.7
7.3
13.3

lean
29.1
29.6
28.5
29.1
29.1
24.2
22.7

weak
27.9
26.9
29.3
27.9
28.8
29.1
28.9

strong
33.1
30.8
36.6
34.3
29.4
39.4
35.1

1195
717
478
865
316
327
211
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in the “folded over” partisan scale. The demographic categories provided are: all
respondents, 14 years education and above, less than 14 years education (14 years was
selected as it was the median in the 2000 data), whites, minorities (this group includes blacks,
Asians, native Americans, and Hispanics), and Protestants and Catholics who attend religious
services. Table 4 below shows the distribution of partisan strength in a number of
demographic groups that are often discussed in relationship to party identification and voter
choice. In the data a pattern is established showing low numbers of pure independents,
higher numbers of strong partisans, with weak partisans and independent leaners occupying
the middle ground. The frequency distributions of partisan intensity are fairly consistent
between the demographic groups.
The question of biblical interpretation is the first to be examined. In table 5 there is some
consistency between 2000 and 2004 in distributions of partisan intensity among the biblical
interpretation responses. With the removal of nonresponsive answers, this left 1693
Table 5. Partisan Intensity by Biblical Interpretation
Bible interpretation
pure
lean
weak
2000 - 1693 valid responses
Literal word of God
10.6
24.2
26.4
Not literal word of God
12.1
27.7
30.3
Word of man
11.1
22.2
37

strong

% of total

# of cases

38.9
29.8
29.6

35
50.7
14.4

592
858
243

2004 - 1162 valid responses
Literal word of God
8.9
25.6
26.6
36.9
429
38.9
Not literal word of God
11.6
28.7
29.6
47.3
550
30
Word of man
5.5
25.1
30.6
15.7
183
38.8
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
2000
25.676
6
.000
2004
21.866
6
.001
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 27.85 in 2000 and 17.64 in 2004.
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responses in 2000 and 1162 responses in 2004. The distributions between the two surveys
were quite similar. In both years we see a plurality of those who take a literal interpretation
of the Bible self-identifying as strong partisans, a plurality of those who take a non-literal
interpretation of the Bible self-identifying as weak partisans, and a plurality of those who see
the Bible as the word of man self-identifying as independent leaners.
Correlation is negative as partisanship moves from 1) pure independent to 4) strong
partisan while biblical interpretation moves from 1) literal to 3) word of man, as it was in the
original ANES data. The results show a pattern that is statistically significant and relatively
consistent over the time period studied. I reject the null hypothesis.
For determining whether a respondent identifies with a particular church or religion,
recoding is necessary. Those who responded that they do attend church other than weddings
and funerals are coded as 0 for the new variable. For those who do not attend church, those
who identify with a particular religion are coded as 1 and those who do not identify with a
particular religion are coded as 5. This coding is consistent with how the original data is
coded by the ANES. The results in table 6 shows the frequencies of partisan strength within
the sample broken down by the respondent’s identification with a particular church or
religion. The pattern established with the Bible interpretation question is mirrored here; the
more religious the respondent, the greater their inclination to self-identify as a partisan.
Correlation is negative as partisanship moves from 1) pure to 4) strong while church
affiliation moves from 0) attends church to 5) respondent has no church affiliation. Again,
the coding is consistent with the coding of the original ANES data. The results demonstrate
a pattern that is statistically significant, consistent with the pattern established by the Bible
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Table 6. Partisan Intensity by Affiliation with a Religion

Denomination
pure
2000 - 1765 valid responses
Attends church
10.2
identifies with church
10.7
18.9
Does not identify with
a church

lean weak strong

% of
total

# of
cases

25.3
29.6
40.3

69.7
16.5
13.8

1231
291
243

28.4
30.2
20.2

36.1
29.6
20.6

2004 - 1190 valid responses
Attends church
9.5 25.6 28.4
66.9
796
36.4
identifies with church
11.8 31.8 27.3
29.1
18.5
220
8.6
27
23.6
14.6
174
40.8
Does not identify with
a church
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
2000 51.879
6
.000
2004 21.934
6
.001
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 27.95 in 2000 and 17.11 in 2004
interpretation, and relatively consistent over the time period studied. I reject the null
hypothesis.
For the question of religious importance/guidance, some recoding was also necessary.
The 2004 ANES had already combined the two questions of religious importance and
guidance. Recoding was necessary for the 2000 results. Responses that indicated that
religion was not important were coded as 0. Responses indicating that religion provided
some, quite a bit, or a great deal of guidance were coded as 1, 3, and 5 accordingly. This was
consistent with how the data was coded for 2004. The results are provided in table 7 on the
next page.
The trends evident in the previous questions were mirrored here, with less religious
individuals being more inclined to self-identify as partisan leaners and more religious
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individuals being more inclined to self-identify as strong partisans. The results show a trend
in the correlation of partisan intensity and how much the respondent relies on religion
Table 7. Partisan Intensity by Importance of Religion

Importance of religion
2000 - 1778 valid responses
Not important
Some guidance
Quite a bit of guidance
A great deal of guidance
2004 - 1185 valid responses
Not important
Some guidance
Quite a bit of guidance
A great deal of guidance

pure

lean

weak

strong

% of
total

# of
cases

13.8
11.8
9.7
11.2

34.9
28.2
25.6
25.1

27.3
31.4
29.4
25

24
28.6
35.3
38.6

23.7
16.2
22
38.1

415
287
391
676

7.5
14.1
8.2
9.9

38.4
28.6
26.5
25.4

27.2
30.5
29.7
26.1

26.9
26.8
35.5
38.6

22.6
18
23.5
35.8

268
213
279
425

Pearson Chi-Square
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.000
2000
36.527
9
.001
2004
28.311
9
Pearson Chi Square: 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 33.10 in 2000 and 20.67 in 2004.
for guidance in their day to day lives. Again, there is little variation between 2000 and 2004.
The correlation is statistically significant and stable over the time period studied. I reject the
null hypothesis.
Table 8 shows that the combined religious score demonstrates a similar trend linking
higher religious scores to stronger partisan intensity as was seen in the Petrocik data. The
2004 sample would appear to be a little less religious than the 2000 sample with the
exception of pure independents who appear to be slightly more religious in the 2004 sample.
The bivariate regression shows a strong correlation between the respondents’ religious
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scores and their self-identified level of partisan strength. Not only is the correlation
significant, but the analysis of variance shows the variation between means is also
significant.
Table 8. Mean Religious Scores by Partisan Strength with Bivariate
Regression and Analysis of Variance.
partisan strength
2000
pure
lean
weak
strong
total

Mean
0.6167
0.6021
0.6643
0.7158
0.6585

N
194
470
470
557
1691

Std. Dev.
0.28746
0.30539
0.2576
0.26195
0.28015

pure
lean
weak
strong
total

0.6569
0.5838
0.6434
0.6980
0.6455

110
335
324
384
1153

0.26886
0.31216
0.2879
0.27639
0.29286

2004

Adjusted R
Square
0.023

2000
B
Std. error
Sig.
Constant
1.451
.062
.000
Religious score
0.563
.087
.000
2004
Constant
1.601
.070
.000
0.012
Religious score
0.388
.099
.000
Bivariate regression with 4-point scale of partisan strength as dependent variable
ANOVA
2000
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
squares
5.399
258.691
264.091

df
1
263
264

Mean Squares
5.399
.984

F
5.489

Sig.
.020

2004
Regression
Residual
Total

4.041
210.678
205.719

1
226
227

4.041
.892

4.528

.034
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The final question of this study was how age influences partisan strength. The samples
were broken down into four different age groups. Respondents age 17 to 29 were coded 0,
ages 30 to 44 were coded 1, 45 to 64 were coded 2, and all others were coded 3. The
research hypothesis considered that older age groups would demonstrate higher levels of
religious affect. The means shown in table 9 bear this out. Whether an earlier age cohort has
been more religious through their lifetime or whether the aging process makes individuals
more religious over their life cycle is a question for another time.
Table 9. Mean Religious Scores by Age
Groups
Age groups
2000
Mean
N
Std. Dev.
17-29
0.6068
268
0.28165
30-44
0.6441
567
0.28965
45-64
0.6697
572
0.28344
65+
0.7024
312
0.25276
total
0.6574
1719
0.28127
2004
17-29
0.6569
110
0.26886
30-44
0.5838
335
0.31216
45-64
0.6434
324
0.28790
65+
0.6980
384
0.27639
total
0.6455
1153
0.29286
To further test the significance of the religious score, I have used a multivariate regression
with partisan strength as the independent variable, to test the respondent’s religious scores,
age, education, and household income. When these other variables are added, religious
scores and age retain significance in 2000 and 2004 while the results for education and
income vary as shown in table 10.
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Based on these results, the inclination for older generations to self-identify as partisans
may include a factor of increased religious devotion than something inherent solely within
age itself.

Table 10. Multivariate Regression with 4-Point Scale
of Partisan Strength as Dependent Variable
Adjusted
Std.
R
2000
B
error
Sig.
Square
Constant
-.579
.145
.000
0.047
Religious
score
.514
.087
.000
Age
.010
.001
.000
Education
.031
.007
.000
Income
.001
.001
.515
2004
Constant
Religious
score
Age
Education

.951

.133

.000

.375
.006
.082

.100
.002
.018

.000
.000
.133

Income

.000

.001

.007

0.038

The results above are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis, while supporting the research
hypothesis. Increased partisanship in older age groups is mirrored by higher religious scores.
To ensure that this significance is bidirectional and not simply a phenomenon of a single
party attracting a large share of religious adherents, dummy variables are introduced for
Democratic and Republican party identifiers. Strong, weak, and leaning Democrats are
coded as 1 with all others (including pure independents) coded as 0 for the Democratic
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dummy variable. Coding for the Republican dummy variable is done the same way with the
three varieties of Republicans being coded as 1 and all others coded as 0.
As shown in table 11, when these dummy variables are introduced, religious scores and
age retain their significance while education and income lose their significance. At the same
time, the correlations between religious scores and age with partisan strength do appear to be
bidirectional.
Table 11. Multivariate Regression with 4-Point Scale
of Partisan Strength as Dependent Variable and
Partisan Direction as Dummy Variables
Adjusted
Std.
R
2000
B
error
Sig.
Square
Constant
-.674
.118
.000
0.442
Religious
score
.419
.067
.000
Age
.006
.001
.000
Education
.012
.006
.047
Income
.001
.001
.109
Democrats
2.050
.061
.000
Republicans
1.928
.063
.000
2004
Constant
-.693
.133
.000
0.396
Religious
score
.346
.080
.000
Age
.006
.001
.000
Education
.011
.006
.051
Income
.001
.001
.520
Democrats
1.998
.081
.000
Republicans
2.096
.082
.000

Discussion
While the validity of using religious measures as a proxy for greater affective reasoning
can be argued, the link between religiosity and partisanship appears to be strong. The three
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measures; biblical interpretation, identification with a church, and religious guidance, each
individually identify a trend of the least religious individuals identifying as independent
leaners, the most religious identifying as strong partisans, with the weak partisans tending to
take a middle of the road stance on religious beliefs.
As with any study that aggregates data through averages and frequencies of group
responses, we are describing only an inclination and not a hard and fast rule. There are
individuals who score a .99 on the religious score who still identify as independent leaners
and there are those who score a .00 on the religious score and identify themselves as strong
partisans. To refer to these individuals as solitary outliers would not be accurate. To refer to
them as minorities amongst those with similar religious scores would be accurate. Similarly,
it is certainly likely that those who score high on the combined religious measure and
identify as strong partisans see little or no relationship between the two.
While my reasoning for seeking correlations between religiosity and partisan strength is
based on the possibility that greater affect in the evaluative process plays into both religiosity
and party affiliation, there is nothing in these data that proves such a link. The argument
could be made that those who attend church and affiliate strongly with a party just like
belonging to groups. While this would still indicate a difference between independent
leaners and weak partisans it would identify the independents as being consistent with the
first part of Dole’s textbook definition of independents as loners, but not necessarily the
second part of the definition of being individuals who think for themselves, even though it is
difficult to indulge in group think when you do not belong to a group. The Bible question
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could be seen as measuring respect for authority and the guidance question could be
interpreted by some as being a measure of compassion.
Although there does appear to be a strong link between religiosity and partisan strength
which is bidirectional, further research would be required to more clearly identify the
theoretical connection between the two. Perhaps a question regarding whether President
Obama is a Christian with the possible responses of “yes”, “no”, and “the question is
irrelevant”, might shed a little light on the subject. One way would be providing erroneous
information early in the interview process that appeals to an ideological worldview, testing
for the acceptance of that erroneous information in the middle of the interview and correcting
the information if it has been accepted, then testing at the end of the interview to see if the
erroneous information or the corrected information was retained.
As with any data, it should be evaluated within the context of the times. Independent
Democrats of the 1960s and 1970s are likely very different from independent Democrats
today. Those of the 1960s and 1970s likely include more of those who are in the process of
realignment including Southern Democrats, Catholic Pro-lifers, and blue-collar Reagan
Democrats. While these more recent figures may be capturing some in the process of
realignment, there is no reason to anticipate a large wave like the realignment of the South. I
believe, but have yet to test, that the relationship between religiosity and partisan strength
would hold up in the data from at least the mid-1980s to 2004. As with other data it would
remain to be seen how an African-American president might change those results.
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Conclusion
The debate over the nature of who are independent leaners was the impetus for this paper.
Those who argue the point that leaners are closet partisans provide a great deal of data on
political behavior as evidence of that fact, yet behavior is not the key to the difference
between partisans and independents. It is the degree to which party loyalty influences the
evaluative process.
Keith et al (1992) carefully document the relationship between age and partisan strength
but attribute this solely to lifecycle effects without recognizing the greater religiosity (not
necessarily conservatism) of the older generations. Whether those older generations started
out more religious, the increased awareness of one’s own mortality, or some other reason is
responsible for this variation is also something for further study that cannot be adequately
covered here. Keith et al (1992) indicated that they saw nothing in the data that warranted
the continuation of the 7-point scale, stating, “a five-point scale combining leaners and weak
partisans seems perfectly satisfactory” (196). I would argue against such a solution.
Although the data examined by these previous scholars yielded no differences, differences
do exist. The specific mechanisms that link religiosity with partisanship cannot be clearly
and empirically derived from the existing data, but a correlation does exist.
There is no doubt that many survey respondents mischaracterize themselves when
responding to the questions from which the 7-point scale is derived. Those who are
responding to the questions are not trained in the meaning of the responses, nor do they know
how those responses might be analyzed. There is no reason to believe that there are any
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more partisans mischaracterizing themselves as independents than there may be strong
partisans who might actually be more appropriately characterized as independent leaners.
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